State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms by Paulsen, Monrad G.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1951
State Constitutions, State Courts and First
Amendment Freedoms
Monrad G. Paulsen
Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paulsen, Monrad G., "State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms" (1951). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper
2200.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2200
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, STATE COURTS AND FIRST
AMENDMENT FREEDOMS
MONRAD G. PAULSEN *
We have recently been reminded that one of the current and recurrent
quandaries of the Supreme Court of the United States arises from the Ameri-
can constitutional system's counterpart of the philosophical problem of the
One and the Many.1 When an individual's freedom is involved, the question
is whether and to what degree state legislators, public officials and judicial
officers shall be called upon to enforce standards of respect for personal
liberties defined by the Federal Constitution and the United States Supreme
Court; or, put another way, how far the first eight amendments of the Federal
Constitution are incorporated into the Fourteenth (the latter is, of course,
binding upon state action). In 1947, the Court by a majority of a single
vote refused to take the doctrinal position that the entire Federal Bill of
Rights is binding upon the states.2 Today, with the replacement of Justices
Rutledge and Murphy by Justices Clark and Minton, the Court seems even
more firmly committed to the position that only certain of the first eight
amendments apply to the states-those which are "fundamental," those which
are "of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Undeniably included
among these fundamental provisions are the prohibitions of the First Amend-
ment.
State court decisions and state constitutional materials are too frequently
ignored by both commentator and counsel when civil liberties questions arise.,
State constitutions furnish extensive and sometimes unique materials which
can help in the protection of human liberties and state courts provide the
forums in which a very great number of civil liberties cases are decided. Thus,
even when the argument for protection rests on Fourteenth Amendmnt
grounds, the lower state courts and state supreme courts are in a strategic
position to serve freedom of expression effectively. A case which, stands for
freedom in the state supreme court need be taken no further for the vindica-
tion of our deepest value. Indeed it is insurance that an aspect of democracy
will not lose vitality because of exposure to the "silent treatment": a denial of
certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.4 State constitutional
materials are particularly important on issues of Church-State separation.
*Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
1. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 7 (1950).
2. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672, 91 L. Ed. 1903 (1947).
3. For a survey of state constitutional cases upsetting state economic regulatory
legislation, see Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process it the States, 34
MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950) ; see also Paulsen, "Natural Rights"--A Constitutional Doctrine
it Indiana, 25 IND. L.J. 123 (1950).
4. Cf. Harper & Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term
-An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 293 (1950).
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STATE CONSTITUTIONS
The overwhelming number of American cases involving the separation of
Church and State have been decided under state constitutions.
This paper will examine some of the legal resources contained in state
constitutions and will inquire how successfully state courts have protected
the liberties of the people. The materials on which this paper is based are:
(1) state constitutional provisions themselves, (2) recent state court opinions
deciding freedom of expression questions arising, wholly or in part under
the Fourteenth Amendment as it incorporates the First as well as similar
questions arising under state constitutions,5 and (3) leading state cases deal-
ing with separation of Church and State.
INTRODUCTION
Some obvious points should be set at rest at the outset about the relation-
ship between the "First Amendment Freedoms" applicable to the states by
way of the Fourteenth Amendment and similar freedoms guaranteed by the
constitutions of the states. State courts still may interpret their state con-
stitutions to protect civil liberties more widely than the Federal Constitution
requires. For example, the Federal Constitution was not violated when a
municipality forbade "loud and raucous" sound trucks to operate on city
streets.6 The freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment, as
read through the eyes of a majority of the Supreme Court of the United
States, did not extend to this particular means of expressing ideas. However,
a state constitutional guarantee of free expression can very well be under-
stood as insisting that the public endure this noise in order that society may
have the benefit of ideas from as many channels as possible. 7 Again, al-
though in 1940 a school board did not violate the freedom of religion clause
of the First Amendment when it required all children to perform the flag
salute as a condition of attending a public school," a state supreme court,
reading its state constitutional provisions for religious freedom, could very
well anticipate the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal of its former stand.9
Of course state courts do not always ignore the interpretation by the Federal
Supreme Court of a constitutional guaranty. Many states will follow the
analogous federal cases in construing their similar state provisions. Indeed, to
5. The labor cases involving civil liberties and the coercive tactics of unions have
been omitted. The cases studied include those of 1946-50.
6. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 Sup. Ct. 448, 93 L. Ed. 513 (1949).
7. In the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals four judges held the ordinance in
question in the Kovacs case a violation of the state as well as the federal constitution.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 135 N.J.L. 584, 52 A.2d 806 (1947).
8. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed.
1375 (1940).
9. See Zavilla v. Masse, 112 Colo. 183, 147 P.2d 823 (1944) ; cf. Gabrielli v. Knicker-
bocker, 12 Cal.2d 85, 82 P.2d 391 (1938) ; People v. Barber, 289 N.Y. 378, 46 N.E.2d 329
(1943). The original flag salute case was reversed in West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 Sup. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943).
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follow similar federal cases in the absence of cogent reasons for departing
therefrom has become in some states a doctrine of state constitutional con-
struction. 0
FREEDOMX[ Or EXPRESSION
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution is more simply
phrased than the analogous state constitutional provisions. Amendment I
simply declares "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
Typical state phrasings of the free speech and press guarantees may be
found by considering the constitutions of Illinois, Utah and Oregon. Article
II, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution provides:
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the
truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient
defense."
The Utah Constitution in Article I, section 15, more nearly follows the
federal example:
"No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the
jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and
was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted;
and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact."
The Oregon Constitution contains a kind of combination of the Utah and
Illinois expressions:
"No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting
the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall
be responsible for the abuse of this right.'"'
The state guarantees of petition and assembly are usually found in con-
stitutional provisions separate from those on free speech and press. Various
state constitutions not only guarantee freedom of worship but also specifically
prohibit a religious test for holding public office,' 2 for the competency of
witnesses,' 3 for voting, 14 for study or teaching in the public schools,1 5 for the
10. E.g., City of Portland v. Thornton, 174 Ore. 508, 149 P.2d 972 (1944).
11. ORE. COxsT. Art. I, § 8.
12. E.g., Aax. CoNsT. Art. II, § 26; Wvo. CONST. Art. I, § 18. In contrast, a few
constitutions require public officers to believe in a "Supreme Being." E.g., S.C. CoNsr.
Art. XVII, § 4.
13. E.g., FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights, § 5; N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 3.
14. E.g., KAm. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 7; UTAH COxST. Art. I, § 4.
15. E.g., NEB. CONST. Art. VII, § 11; N.M. CONST. Art. XII, § 9.
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enjoyment of "any civil or political right, privilege or capacity."'16 Some
constitutions provide exemption from service in the militia for those whose
religious convictions do not permit the bearing of arms.17 In the cases dis-
cussed below those involving freedom of worship have been treated along
with those of free press and free speech.
The extent of freedom of speech has seldom turned upon the pecuiliar
way in which a state constitution has phrased its free speech provision.
However, provisions like that of Illinois which contain a reminder that a
speaker is responsible for the abuse of his liberty have occasionally been
referred to in libel cases. Recently in California a litigant took the position
that the constitutional phrase referring to penalties for abuse of speech had
the effect of constitutionally freezing the law of libel as of the date of
California's Constitution.'8 Therefore, the litigant argued, a statute which cut
down a newspaper's common law liability for libel was unconstitutional. Need-
less to say, the contention failed. In Missouri's new Constitution of 1945,
more than a narrow conception of freedom of speech and press was intended,
when the following italicized portion of Article I, section 8, of the Missouri
Constitution was added: ". . . no law shall be passed impairing the freedom
of speech, no inatter by what means communicated; . . . every person shall
be free to say, write, or publish, or otherwise coninnicate whatever he will
on any subject. . . ." (Italics added.) The constitutional right of expression
in Missouri would not seem to be altered merely by a new technology which
provides a means of communication unknown to the constitution makers.19
The Utah provision concerning freedom of speech is typical of many
other states in setting out that in prosecutions or suits for libel truth shall
be given in evidence to the juries and shall be a defense if the matter was
published with good motives and that the jury shall have the right to deter-
mine both the law and the fact in a libel suit. The reason for this provision can
be understood by a reference to English experience which culminated in
Fox's Libel Act of 1792. This Act, wlhich allotted to the jury in a criminal
trial for libel the task of deciding whether the words were defamatory, was
passed because the judges had twisted the prosecutions for libel into methods
of obtaining a conviction of political offenders.20 Such prosecutions today
would probably violate the First Amendment, but the constitutions of some
states nevertheless provide the additional protection of jury determination of
the entire question.
16. E.g., ILL. CONST. Art. II, § 3; cf. W. VA. CONsT. Art. III, § 15.
17. E.g., KAN. CoNsr. Art. 8, § 1; Wyo. CONST. Art. XVII, § 1.
18. See Werner v. Southern Calif. Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal.2d 121, 216 P.2d 825
(1950) ; see also Ross v. Gore, 48 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
19. Cf. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387,
59 L. Ed. 552 (1915), in which the United States Supreme Court held that movies
were not protected from censorship by the state constitution of Ohio.
20. WINFIELD, TORTS § 78 (4th ed. 1948).
1951 J
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Of the reported state court decisions involving freedom of expression
most of the recent cases have dealt with the constitutional questions under
both the state constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. An unusual
exception arose in Massachusetts. Thomas W. Bowe applied for a mandate
to prevent the submission of a proposed initiative law which would make
political contributions by labor unions illegal. Amendment 48 of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution which provides for the initiative also forbids submitting
to the people any proposed initiative inconsistent with the rights of freedom
of speech, press, election and assembly set forth in the Massachusetts Declara-
tion of Rights. In the light of this provision the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court granted the mandate because it felt the proposed initiative
would violate Article 16 (freedom of the press) and Article 19 (the guarantee
of freedom to assemble and to consult upon the common good), thereby de-
priving unions of substantial and important political rights. 21 To be effective,
political action as a matter of group organization involved the right to print,
to circulate views, to appear in public assemblies and to broadcast over the
radio. All this costs money, and if defined groups could not use money for
these purposes their essential freedoms were contracted to the vanishing point.
Organized labor could not get its message to the electorate; its rights of
freedom of the press and freedom to assemble would be crippled.
State courts have not always been so sensible of the requisites for effective
political organization and the dissemination of political views. Admittedly a
sound truck disturbs the peace and quiet of the community. Yet a candidate
,with a limited budget and without substantial newspaper support may have
no other way to get his views before the electorate. Since the Supreme Court
of the United States sustained the municipal ban by Trenton, New Jersey
on "loud and raucous noises" emitting from loud speakers and sound
amplifiers,22 both Florida 23 and Pennsylvania 24 have upheld what seem to be
absolute prohibitions of any sound making devices, at least when used at a
busy thoroughfare in the heart of a city's business district. Both of these state
cases demonstrate an eagerness to read the Supreme Court case as permitting
any sound truck curb and to recognize the broadest municipal powers. When,
to be constitutionally protected at all, a sound truck must speak softly and, at
that, only in thinly occupied areas, an inexpensive channel of propaganda
dissemination is almost completely obstructed.
Toleration of speakers with manners and views obnoxious to listeners
has been a recent issue for state courts and in only one instance have the
orators of doubtful taste prevailed against peace officers. In Colorado on
21. Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115, 167
A.L.R. 1447 (1946).
22. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 Sup. Ct. 488, 93 L. Ed. 53 (1949).
23. State ex rel. Nicholas v. Headley, 48 So.2d (Fla. 1950).
24. Commonwealth v. Geuss, 76 A.2d 500 (Pa. Stiper. 1950).
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the evening of December 21, 1948, a group of people, 50 to 75 in number,
assembled in front of the governor's residence. Milling about, they chanted,
"Governor Knous come out of the house" and "the death of Ruben Garcia is
on your shoulders," "stop beating the boys." The chanting, like a football
cheer, was high pitched and could be heard at least two blocks away. Never-
theless the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the leaders" conviction for
breach of the peace, holding that the crowd was merely carrying out the
right peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances.25 In three other cases of allegedly disorderly speech, the state
courts, concerned with the possibility of violence on the part of those ex-
horted by the speaker, denied constitutional protection to the speaker.2 6 Two
of these decisions27 were reversed by the United States Supreme Court, but
the third was upheld .2 In that case the defendant, a student at Syracuse
University, addressed a crowd of eighty persons on the city streets. The
group, consisting of both white and colored people, heard the defendant call
the mayor of Syracuse "a champagne sipping bum" and the American Legion
a "Nazi Gestapo agency." Although some angry muttering occurred through-
out the crowd, there was no disorder. Two police officers were present at the
scene. The defendant, continuing, said that Negroes did not have equal rights
and should rise up in arms to fight for them. One of the officers present
gained the impression that the defendant was trying to arouse the Negroes
against the whites. A member of the crowd approached the officer and said
that if the police did not act to stop the speaker, the listeners would do it in
their stead. At this point one of the officers asked the defendant to stop speak-
ing, which he refused to do. His arrest followed immediately. In upholding
this conviction the Supreme Court of the United States was concerned with
the extent of federal protection of the freedom of speech. Nevertheless, it
should be repeated, the state court could have adopted the constitutional
position taken by the three dissenting justices of the Supreme Court.
When courts are moved to silence speakers because of the possibilit; of
group violence, an open invitation is extended to the professional meeting
breaker and rowdy. The only practical way to give the greatest freedom of
speech is to protect the speaker and insist that the officials of the 'com-
munity provide adequate police protection where that is conceivably possible.
Recently state courts have also had to determine whether speaking and
meeting in public parks or distributing literature on the public street can be
25. Flores v. City and County of Denver, 220 P.2d. 373 (Colo. 1950).
26. Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39 (1948) ; People v. Kunz, 300
N.Y. 273, 90 N.E.2d 455 (1949) ; People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 91 N.E.2d 316 (1950);
cf. Loomis v. City of Atlanta, 82 Ga. App. 346, 60 S.E.2d 397 (1950).
27. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 Sup. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949) ; Kunz
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 Sup. Ct. 312 (1951).
28. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 Sup. Ct. 303 (1951).
19511]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
forbidden or confined by a license requirement of a state or municipal or-
ganization. The states have followed, sometimes reluctantly,20 the authorita-
tive decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Licensing arrange-
ments have been invalidated where they place complete discretion to grant
permits in the hands of a local police official, or when they make censorship
possible by allowing permits to be denied for reasons other than traffic con-
trol or the fair sharing of public park facilities.3 0 The New York Court of
Appeals has introduced the doctrine that even though no standard for the
issuance of permits exists in the ordinance itself, where long administrative
practice has granted permits to all who apply, the ordinance will be construed
as restricting official discretion so that only constitutional conditions may be
attached to the issuance of permits.31
In two cases state supreme courts may have limited legislative power
beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution. The Virginia Supreme
Court reversed, on both state and federal grounds, the conviction of a maga-
zine subscription salesman for selling subscriptions in public without a
municipally required permit from the Director of Public Safety.3 2 The sales-
man was employed by the National Publishing Company, the publisher of
29. In speaking of some federal cases, a New Jersey judge lamented, "I am unable,
sitting here as a single justice, to overrule the court's decisions to which I have referred.
. . ." Evans v. Lepore, 59 A.2d 385, 386 (N.J. 1948). The Massachusetts Supreme Court
has recently written: "Within the field now occupied by decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States it would be merely academic and futile for us to inquire in every
instance whether in construing the Constitution of this Commonwealth we would go as
far as that court has gone in construing the Constitution of the United States." Com-
monwealth v. Gilfedder, 321 Mass. 335, 73 N.E.2d 241, 245 (1947).
30. People v. Duffy, 79 Cal. App.2d 875, 179 P.2d 876 (1947); New Orleans v.
Hood, 212 La. 485, 32 So.2d 899 (1947); Commonwealth v. Gilfedder, 321 Mass. 335,
73 N.E.2d 241 (1947) ; Kenyon v. Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241, 175 A.L.R.
430 (1946) ; People v. Ciocarian, 317 Mich. 349, 26 N.W.2d 404 (1946) ; Evans v. Lepore,
59 A.2d 385 (N.J. 1948) ; State v. Guillotte, 77 A.2d 65 (N.J. Co. Ct. 1950) ; see also
cases in note 31 in!ra. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upset a Milwaukee County ordi-
nance forbidding religious services in the park even though it was argued that to permit
the services was an unconstitutional aid to religion. Milwaukee County v. Carter, 45
N.W.2d 90 (Wis. 1950).
By asserting that the jury was judge of both law and fact in Maryland, the Mary-
land Supreme Court refused to review a trial court's conviction of a Jehovah's Witness
for speaking in the public parks without permission. Niemotko v. State, 71 A.2d 9 (Md.
1950). The opportunity for the Witnesses to speak was insured only after a successful
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,
71 Sup. Ct. 325 (1951). United Artists Corp. v. Board of Censors, 189 Tenn. 397,
225 S.W.2d 550 (1949), is another case denying freedom of expression on narrow local
procedural grounds.
Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses have unsuccessfully asserted a right to enter
apartments or rooming houses against the wishes of the owner. Fort Scott v. Arbuckle,
164 Kan. 49, 187 P.2d 348 (1947); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433 (1948). Advertising handbills can be con-
stitutionally banned. People v. Uffindell, 90 Cal. App.2d 881, 202 P.2d 874 (1949).
31. People v. Nahman, 298 N.Y. 95, 81 N.E.2d 36 (1948); People v. Hass, 299
N.Y. 190, 86 N.E.2d 169 (1949); cf. People v. Kunz, 300 N.Y. 273, 90 N.E.2d 455(1949) ; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal.2d 460, 171 P.2d 8 (1946).
32. Robert v. Norfolk, 188 Va. 413, 49 S.E.2d 697 (1948) ; cf. E.r partc Mares, 75




Sports Digest, Fashion Parade, Mly Lady and several trade journals. The
Virginia court construed the free press guarantee to include solicitation of
subscriptions because solicitation is merely the first step in the whole process
of circulation and publication. Although the opinion relied largely on federal
materials, the court noted that the Virginia Constitution's free speech article
which states, "Any citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his senti-
ments on all subjects," was broader than the First Amendment. In South
Dakota, the state court held that Jehovah's Witnesses could not be compelled
to pay a sales tax on the sale of their literature.33 The court considered bind-
ing the federal case, Murdock v. Pennsylvania'4 which invalidated a city's
nondiscriminatory license fee imposed on Jehovah's Witnesses who sold litera-
ture of their sect on the city streets. In an analogous case, California im-
posed a personal property tax on pamphlets, books and other literature stored
and used by the Jehovah's Witnesses. 35 In distinguishing Illrdock, the
California court saw a difference between a license tax which applies to the
activity itself and a nondiscriminatory tax on property used or employed in
connection with the activity.
State and federal guarantees of the free exercise of religion have
created problems for state courts when a religionist's choice of action runs
counter to legislative enactments in the public interest. In two instances,
legislative acts prohibiting solicitation to perform a marriage were upheld.3'
A state's power to deny unemployment compensation has been affirmed where
the applicant could not present himself for work on Saturday, a day which
his religious convictions required him to observe as a day of meditation and
rest.3 7 Mohammedan parents have been convicted of violating the compulsory
attendance laws of the Pennsylvania school code because they persistently
refused to send their children to school on Friday, the sacred day of the
Mohammedans. 38 Virginia compulsory school laws were violated when par-
ents, on the ground of religious belief, claimed the right of sole instruction
of their children. 39 A state can compel vaccination of children in spite of the
parents' contrary religious beliefs.40 Three cases have upheld criminal con-
victions imposed upon the leaders of a religious group which displays and
33. State v. Van Daalan, 69 S.D. 466, 11 N.W.2d 523 (1943). In Tampa Times Co.
v. Tampa, 158 Fla. 589, 29 So.2d 368 (1947), appeal dismissed, 332 U.S. 749 (1947), the
Florida Supreme Court upheld, although applied to newspapers, a nondiscriminatory
annual retail and wholesale license tax.
34. 319 U.S. 105, 63 Sup. Ct. 870, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943).
35. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. v. Los Angeles County, 30 Cal.2d 426, 182
P.2d 178 (1947).
36. Ladd v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1950); Hopkins v. State, 69
A.2d 456 (Md. 1949).
37. Kut v. Albers Super Markets, 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643 (1946).
38. Commonwealth v. Bey, 70 A.2d 693 (Pa. Super. 1950).
39. Rice v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 224, 49 S.E.2d 342 (1948).
40. Mosier v. Barren County Board of Health, 308 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948).
19511
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
handles poisonous snakes in the course of its religious ceremony.41 A con-
viction of members of a Mormon sect for unlawful conspiracy to advocate,
teach and counsel the practice of polygamy was affirmed in Utah,4 2 and in
California a city's zoning ordinance was upheld although it excluded a
Mormon church from a residential area.43
Newspapers and radio stations have infrequently engaged in state litiga-
tion to vindicate the freedom of the press. One case arose in Illinois when
Montgomery Ward sought an injunction to restrain a union from sowing
distrust among the customers and employees of Ward's through the union's
official publication, "The Retail and Wholesale Department Store Employee. '44
The magazine allegedly had made untrue assertions about the prices charged
on merchandise, employees' benefits, etc. The Illinois appellate court re-
fused to grant an injunction on the ground that a court cannot constitutionally
censor in advance of publication. Three cases, two involving newspapers
and one involving a radio station, have attempted to reconcile the requirement
of fair trial with the uncertain value of free newspaper commentary on a
trial in progress. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held constitutional a
Wisconsin statute which made it a crime to publish the identity of a female
allegedly raped or subjected to a criminal assault.45 There is merit in the
court's assertion that the small benefit to society of knowing the identity of
the unfortunate girl is outweighed by the value of concealment to her and
her family. But the assertion that "Whether there is a 'clear and present
danger' warranting the enactment of the statute is for the legislature," 40 is
an unwarranted abdication of a state supreme court's role in protecting per-
sonal liberty. In Mississippi the supreme court reversed the conviction of
a newspaper woman for contempt of court.47 She had interviewed a witness
whom the, judge had charged to talk only with counsel. The supreme court
disclaimed any general right of a trial court to deny the press opportunity
to learn and publish -legitimate facts of a trial in progress. In Baltimore
several radio stations were held in contempt of court for broadcasting a story
concerning an alleged confession made to the police by a defendant in a pend-
ing criminal case. The Maryland Supreme Court, relying wholly on the
Fourteenth Amendment, decided the broadcast had not deprived the defendant
41. State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179 (1949) ; Harden v. State, 188 Tenn.
17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948), 2 VAND. L. REv. 694 (1949) ; Kirk v. Commonwealth, 186
Va. 839, 44 S.E.2d 409 (1947).
42. State v. Musser, 110 Utah 534, 175 P.2d 724 (1946).
43. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App.2d 656, 203
P.2d. 823 (1949).
44. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Employees,
330 Ill. App. 49, 70 N.E.2d 75 (1946).
45. State v. Evjue, 253 Wis. 146, 33 N.W.2d 305 (1948).
46..33 N.W.2d at 311.
47. Brannon v. State, 202 Miss. 571, 29 So.2d 916 (1947),
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of a fair trial nor had it created a clear and present danger of a denial of a
fair trial.48
Perhaps the most difficult application of free speech concepts for today's
state courts arises from the world tensions which have enhanced the
fear of the disciplined ranks of the Communist party and its wellknown
devotion to the interests of the Soviet Union. A new wave of state and
municipal legislation, designed to curb Communist subversive activity, has
swept over many parts of the country. Some of these enactments threaten
the liberty of everyone but the most orthodox. In these challenges to "First
Amendment Freedoms," the initial analysis of federal constitutional protection
as well as that afforded by state documents, comes from the state courts.
To identify the loyal and to dismiss'the disloyal seems increasingly
important to state and municipal legislators when the persons involved are
either public officials or public employees, especially members of the teaching
profession. A New Jersey act requires an oath of the governor, of state
officers, of all persons required by law to give assurance of loyalty to the
government of the state (including lawyers when admitted to the bar) and
of all candidates for nomination or election to any public office. The oath,
as can be seen from the italicized portions, is extraordinarily broad.
"... I do not believe in, advocate or advise the use of force, or violence, or other
unlawful or unconstitutional means, to overthrow or make any change in the Govern-
ment established in the United States or in this State; and that I am not a member
of or affllated with any organization, association, party, group or combination of
persons, which approves, advocates, advises or practices the use of force, or violence, or
other unlawful or unconstitutional means, to overthrow or make any change in either
of the Governments so established. . ...
In 1949 nominees of the Progressive Party for governor and for mem-
bership in the state legislature sought to restrain the Secretary of State -and
several county clerks from printing "refused oath of allegiance" under their
names on the general election ballot, and also asked a general injunction
against enforcing the loyalty oath statute. In holding the challenged legisla-
tion unconstitutional in so far as it applied to the governor, to members of the
legislature and to candidates for those offices, the opinion of the New Jersey
Supreme Court demonstrates the protection which state constitutions can
afford, when considered a bulwark of civil liberties.50 The New Jersey Con-
48. Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 67 A2d 497, 67 A.L.R.2d 497 (Md. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912, 70 Sup. Ct. 252, 94 L. Ed. 562 (1950) (separate opinion by
Frankfurter, J.).
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 41:1-3 (Supp. 1950) (italics added).
50. Imbrie v. Marsh, 3 N.J. 578, 71 A.2d 352, 3 VAND. L. Rv. 811 (1950). In
Nevada, university professors and school teachers may be able to take advantage of the
Itnbrie case without the burden of placing themselves in the category of "public officers."
Art. XI, § 5 of the Nevada Constitution especially prescribes an oath of allegiance
and office for them.
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stitution prescribes the oaths of office for legislators and state officers and
the court asked whether, "these oaths ... [were] exclusive as to the members
of the Legislature and State officers and therefore beyond the power of the
Legislature to add to, subtract from, or in anywise vary?" 51 To give a nega-
tive answer would empower the legislature to impose qualifications for public
office in addition to those prescribed in the Constitution, and accordingly,
the statute was invalidated. Although the decision is placed on a narrow
technical ground, Chief Justice Vanderbilt demonstrates an understanding
of what he called the "danger, both religious and politica" ' 2 of legislative
oaths. The opinion contains a detailed history of the use of parliamentary
religious oaths in England from Elizabethan times until the middle of the 19th
century. During that period English legislators were required to swear that
the sovereign was the supreme spiritual head of the realm; and that the
declarant did not believe in transubstantiation, in the invocation of saints or
in the sacrifice of the mass. Although Chief Justice Vanderbilt's opinion
refers to English experience, political repressions by means of oaths have
occurred in the United States. After the Civil War ex-Confederates fre-
quently found themselves barred from public employment or even from the
professions because of inability to execute an oath of present and past loyalty
to the United States. A provision of the West Virginia Constitution (adopted
in 1872) is one state's reaction to the problem:
"Political tests, requiring persons, as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of their
civil and political rights, to purge themselves by their own oaths, of past alleged
offences, are repugnant to the principles of free government, and are cruel and op-
pressive. No religious or political test oath shall be required as a prerequisite or
qualification to vote, serve as a juror, sue, plead, appeal, or pursue any profession or
employment."'
The foregoing considerations were rejected when the Court of Appeals
of Maryland expressly refused to follow the lead of the New Jersey case
and upheld Maryland's antisubversive law, popularly called the Ober Act. 4
That Act provides, "No person shall become a candidate for election ...to
any public office ... unless he . . .shall file . . . an affidavit that he ... is
not a subversive person.. . ." A subversive person is defined as anyone who
51. Imbrie v. Marsh, 71 A.2d at 356.
52. Id. at 358.
* 53. W. VA. CoNsT. Art. III, § 11. The Arizona Constitution provides: "... no
religious or political test or qualification shall ever be required as a condition of admission
into any public educational institution of the state, as teacher, student, or pupil. . . ." Art.
XI, § 7.
In their attempt to regain their positions by court action, those California university
professors who were dismissed for failure to take an anti-Communist oath rely partly on a
portion of Art. IX, § 9 of the California Constitution which provides: "The university
shall be entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom
in the appointment of its regents and in the administration of its affairs." Petitioners'
Reply Brief p. 6, Tolman v. Underhill, No. 7946, pending in the District Court of Appeal,
3d Dist. (1950).
54. Shub v. Simpson, 76 A2d 332 (Md. 1950), upholding Aid. Acts 1949, c.86.
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commits or advises any person to commit any act intended to overthrow or
assist in the overthrow or alteration of the constitutional form of the govern-
ment by "revolution, force or violence," or any person who is a member of a
subversive organization or of a foreign subversive organization. Further, a
foreign subversive organization is defirned as one controlled, directed or
dominated directly or indirectly by a foreign power whose purpose is to
advocate the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the American govern-
ment and to establish in its place a form of government directed and con-
trolled by a foreign power. The validity of this statute was raised when the
Maryland court was asked whether the Secretary of State should accept the
nomination of the Progressive Party's candidates for governor and for
Congress in one of the Maryland districts although they had not executed the
required oath. The Maryland Progressives seemed to have a stronger case
in Maryland than had their New Jersey brothers because, in contrast to the
New Jersey Constitution, Article 37 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights
provides "nor shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the
oath prescribed by this Constitution." This apparent advantage was illusory.
A majority of the Maryland court avoided the difficulties which Article 37
presented by considering the requirement not an oath of office but only an
affidavit insuring the qualifications of the candidate to hold the office he
sought. Once the oaths were so characterized, the Maryland court could
easily uphold the statute as applied to state offices, because a 1948 amendment
to the Maryland Constitution had prohibited office holding by a member of any
organization which advocates the overthrow of the government by force or
violence. 55 Therefore, in Maryland, a subversive could not hold office.
The Progressives, however, maintained that the oath required by the
Ober Act went beyond the scope of the constitutional amendment, particularly
since the Act required an affirmation of nonmembership in foreign con-
trolled organizations. Taking the oath, they argued, might not be possible for
members of nonviolent foreign organizations which aimed at an orderly
alteration of the American constitutional system. For example, the oath
could not be taken by members of a foreign controlled labor organization
seeking by constitutional amendment to change this government's character
to correspond with-Great Britain's labor government, if, in the attempt, Great
Britain would gain some control over this country. The court met this con-
tention by declaring it would read the statute in the light of the purposes
for which it was passed; control of Maryland's segment of the world Com-
munist movement. The New Jersey case was discussed at length but dis-
tinguished on two grounds: (1) New Jersey did not have a constitutional
provision similar to Maryland's which forbids members of subversive organiza-
55. MD. CoNsT. Art. 15, § 11.
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tions from holding public office, and (2) in the New Jersey oath the affiant
swore he did not- believe in the overthrow of the government by force. For
these reasons the court sustained the act as it applied to the Progressive
Party's candidate for governor. But with respect to the candidate for Congress,
the act was held invalid since the state of Maryland had no power to pre-
scribe qualifications for membership in Congress. "There is nothing in the
United States Constitution which in terms prevents a member of Congress
from being a subversive person who seeks to overthrow the government of
the United States by force or violence."5 6 The majority opinion, citing three
federal cases, said the Ober Act did not abridge freedom of speech, press and
assembly; nor was it unconstitutionally vague or a bill of attainder. 1 Two
justices dissented on the state constitutional ground of whether the addi-
tional oath was constitutionally permissible.
The most recent state court opinion involving state control of subver-
sives in government comes from the New York Court of Appeals, which
upheld the Feinberg Law."8 A 1939 statute barred the appointment to or
continued employment in any state office or position of persons who became
members of groups teaching or advocating the overthrow of government by
force or unlawful means. Ten years later the legislature enacted the Feinberg
Law, designed to prevent the dissemination of subversive propaganda among
children in the public schools. It provided that the Board of Regents of New
York should list organizations it considered subversive. Membership in any
organization included on the list would constitute prima facie evidence of
disqualification for appointment to or retention in any position in the public
schools of the state. Three cases, started in the trial courts, were consolidated
on appeal: one on behalf of the Communist party of the state of New York;
one on behalf of persons presently or formerly employed in the public school
system; and the third on behalf of Teachers Union, Local 555 of the United
Public Workers. Each case asked to have the Feinberg Law declared un-
constitutional. In upholding the statute, the court of appeals expressed great
deference for the judgment of the legislature in weaving a new strand in
the mesh by which applicants for teaching jobs are screened. The Feinberg
Law did not unwarrantedly infringe on freedom of speech, assembly or asso-
ciation. The legislature had found a clear and present danger of an infiltra-
tion by members of subversive groups into the public schools. Given the
legislature's findings and purpose, "we cannot say there is no rational relation
between the legislative findings which prompted the enactment of the Fein-
berg Law and the measures prescribed therein to safeguard the public school
56. 76 A.2d at 340.
57. Id. at 339-40. The bill of attainder argument is much too easily dismissed in
these oath cases. See Wormuth, On Bills of Attainder: A Non-Communist Manifesto,
3 WEST. POL. Q. 52 (1950).
58. Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950).
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system of the State."50 The New York case at least recognized that "there
are limitations upon those grounds upon which public employment may be
denied-for example an applicant's religion. 60
Power over employees, equaled only by that of the most inquisitorial of
private employers, has been conferred on local governments in California.6 1
The opinions in these cases are notable chiefly because (1) they approve the
imposition of a very broad loyalty statement (in one case employees were
required to state whether they had directly or indirectly supported 142 named
organizations) ;62 and (2) they lean heavily on the doctrine that while one
has a right to be a member of organizations and to be politically active, one
has no right to a government job.68 The opinions argue that a private em-
ployer would be justified in inquiring into an employee's loyalty, and hence,
the government may also do so. "[N]o one would think of claiming that a
prospective member of the Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks was
having his constitutional rights violated because such Order, before ad-
mitting a member, requires that he take an obligation to be loyal to the govern-
ment of the United States of America."64
State required antisubversive oaths are being employed for purposes
other than ferreting out disloyal public employees. The Alabama Supreme
Court in an advisory opinion said that a state constitutional provision making
a loyalty oath a qualification for voting would not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 5 A 1949 Ohio statute requiring that a loyalty oath be attached
to any claim for unemployment compensation has been challenged only in a
trial court at this writing. The trial judge's opinion,6 6 probably one of the
twenty most hysterical judicial expressions in print,67 rests on a doctrinal
59. 95 N.E2d at 815.
60. Id. at 811.
61. Garner v. Board of Public Works, 220 P.2d 958 (Cal. App. 1950); Steiner v.
Darby, 88 Cal. App.2d 481, 199 P.2d 429 (1948).
62. Steiner v. Darby, .supra note 61.
63. The constitutionality of rules limiting the right of public employees to join labor
unions has been upheld. Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App.2d 638, 178 P.2d
537 (1947) ; King v. Priest, 357 Mo. 68, 206 S.W.2d 547 (1947) ; Springfield v. Clouse,
356, Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); C.I.O. v. Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946). In the Missouri cases, Art. I, § 29, of the Missouri Constitution which
recognizes the right to organize was held inapplicable to public servants. In the King
case three judges in a separate concurring opinion implied the existence of some con-
stitutional limit on the'conditions which attach to a government job, saying that the
majority opinion "seems to be so broad as to place unreasonable restrictions on the rights
of members of the police department as citizens to meet and to join organizations, the
purpose of which would not be inconsistent with proper police discipline or inimical to
public welfare." 206 S.W.2d at 558.
64. Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App2d 481, 199 P.2d 429, 435 (1948).
65. Opinion of the Justices, 252 Ala. 351, 40 So.2d 849 (1949).
66. Dworken v. Collopy, 91 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio C.P. 1950).
67. Something of the flavor of this opinion should be recorded: "It is a well
recognized fact that those who most vociferously appeal to all the constitutional and
statutory provisions provided to safeguard human rights, are those who violate the
laws and then seek immunity from punishment by every legal means which their
ingenuity may contrive, and it would seem that those who are most insistent on the
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foundation similar to the California cases previously discussed. A privilege
can be granted on any terms which pleases the legislature. Unemployment
compensation is a gratuity furnished by the state and can be conditioned
upon the recipient's loyalty.
A California Supreme Court case stands alone among contemporary
opinions.68 It invalidated an oath requirement on the broad ground of re-
pugnance to the constitutionally protected freedom of expression. The statute
involved in that case created a "civic center" around every public school and
provided that the school buildings should be available for public meetings and
other civic affairs. The statute, however, denied the use of the school build-
ing to any individual, organization or group which advocated or had as an
objective the overthrow of the government by force.
Members and officers of the San Diego Civil Liberties Committee wished
to use a school building in San Diego to discuss civil liberty problems of the
community. The Board of Education asked them to swear they did not ad-
vocate and were not affiliated with any organization which advocated the
overthrow by force or violence of the present government of the United
States or of any state. The Committee refused to execute the oath and brought
a mandamus proceeding to compel the School Board to grant the use of the
school auditorium. The stand of the Committee was approved by the California
Supreme Court, which agreed that although the state was not obliged to make
public school buildings available for public meetings, yet when it did so the
buildings must be open to all. To prohibit subversive elements from exercising
rights of free speech would offend the constitution. Consequently proof cannot
be required that any person or group is nonsubversive. justice Traynor pro-
claimed a liberal's understanding of the guarantees of freedom of speech:
"The very purpose of a forum is the interchange of ideas, and that purpose cannot
be frustrated by a censorship that would label certain convictions and affiliations suspect,
denying the privilege of assembly to those who held them, but granting it to those whose
convictions and affiliations happened to be acceptable and in effect amplifying their
privilege by making it a special one. In the competitive struggle of ideas for acceptance
they would have a great strategic advantage in making themselves known and heard
in a forum where the competition had been diminished by censorship, and their very
freedom would intensify the suppression of those condemned to silence. It is not for
the state to control the influence of a public forum by censoring the ideas, the pro-
ponents, or the audience; if it could, that freedom which is the life of democratic
exercise of their right of free speech are those who want to use that right to the
detriment of others. . . . In these present parlous times one should be willing to stand
up and be counted as a loyal citizen, and when anyone protests to be so counted, as being
an infringement on his constitutional rights, he immediately draws suspicion upon himself
and raises doubts as to his loyalty and his worthiness to enjoy those rights which he
thus asserts." Id. at 571. Higher on the list of the "hysterical twenty" is the opinion
of another Ohio trial court judge which upheld a" loyalty oath required of teachers in
the Cleveland schools. Dworken v. Cleveland Board of Education, 94 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio
C.P. 1950).
68. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
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assembly would be stilled. And the dulling effects of censorship on a community are
more to be feared than the quickening influence of a live interchange of ideas."
'
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The American constitutional system not only guarantees freedom to
worship without interference by government, but also embraces the notion
that the government should not promote religious activity. Both state and
federal constitutions clearly prohibit the setting up of any religion with the
prerogatives of an established church. The First Amendment, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court, requires the states to maintain "a Wall
of separation between church and State."70 The idea behind this separation
is not merely political, designed to minimize the divisive impact of religious
controversy and the special privileges which could be given to religious
groups. It is also a distinctly religious conception.71 The Church, conceived of
as a voluntary spiritual body held together by the hearts of men, lies behind
the principle of separation. It gains its vitality from the voluntary adherence
of its members and desires no state aid in the propagation of its point of view.
It asks merely for the right to work by means of persuasion throughout the
community. The state has no legitimate concern with religion, a wholly
personal matter.
In maintaining the separation a wide range of problems arise. Can a
state's money be appropriated when it contributes in part to the continuance
of parochial schools? Can religious instruction be given in the schools? Can
state expenditures be made to support charitable institutions controlled by
religious groups? Can state officials lend their prestige to the promotion of
religion and religious ceremonies? These questions have usually been disposed
of under the provisions of state constitutions. In fact, in only one case has
the United States Supreme Court ever invalidated a state's activities as in-
fringing the constitutional principle of separation. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
69. Id. at 548, 171 P.2d at 893.
70. A phrase from Thomas Jefferson quoted in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1879).
71. "The second principle, embodying the more purely religious view of the question,
starts from the conception of the church as a spiritual body existing for spiritual pur-
poses, and moving' along spiritual paths. It is an assemblage of men who are united by
their devotion to an unseen Being, their memory of a past divine life, their belief in the
possibility of imitating that life, so far as human frailty allows, their hopes for an
illimitable future. Compulsion of any kind is contrary to the nature of such a body,
which lives by love and reverence, not by law. It desires no State help, feeling that its
strength comes from above, and that its kingdom is not of this world. It does not
seek for exclusive privileges, conceiving that these would not only create bitterness
between itself and other religious bodies, but might attract persons who did not really
share its sentiments, while corrupting the simplicity of those who are already its mem-
bers. Least of all can it submit to be controlled by the State, for the State, in such a
world as the present, means persons many or most of whom are alien to its beliefs and
cold to its emotions. The conclusion follows that the church as a spiritual entity will
be happiest and strongest when it is left absolutely to itself, not patronized by the civil
power, not restrained by law except when and in so far as it may attempt to, quit its
proper sphere and intermeddle in secular affairs." 2 BRYCE, TEE AMERMCA-N COMMON-
MONWEALTE 700 (3d ed. 1899).
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Board of Education,72 declared unconstitutional a scheme of religious instruc-
tion provided by religious leaders in public school buildings during regular
school hours. Other federal cases have sustained against First and Fourteenth
Amendment arguments, a federal appropriation to a hospital controlled by a
church,7 3 a state's donation of textbooks to students in parochial schools, 4
and a state's expenditure which reimbursed the parents of children attending
a church school for sums they had paid to secure school bus transportation,"
A great variety of state constitutional provisions bear on the issue of
Church-State separation. Utah, the commonwealth having the most recent
experience with substantial church domination, has perhaps the broadest state-
ment of the separation requirement:
"The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no
religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror
on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. There shall be no union of
Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its func-
tions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious
worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
No property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, or hold office, except
as provided in this Constitution."'
Other constitutions, like that of Illinois provide: "No person shall be re-
quired to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against his
consent, nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomina-
tion or mode of worship."17 Still others prohibit the appropriation of money
or property for religious or sectarian purposes. 8 In some instances expendi-
tures to religious or sectarian institutions are forbidden.m" Oregon80 and
Michigan 81 expressly prohibit payment by the state for any religious services
held in either house of the legislature.
Nearly every state constitution contains provisions expressly applicable
to the relationship between religion and the public schools, the most fre-
quently and bitterly litigated Church-State issue. Some constitutions forbid
religious or sectarian instruction in the schools,82 some forbid appropriations
to aid parochial schools8 3 and some contain expressed prohibition of both.8'
72. 333 U.S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
73. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 20 Sup. Ct. 121, 44 L. Ed. 168 (1899).
74. Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, 50 Sup. Ct. 335, 74 L. Ed. 913
(1930).
75. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947).
76. UTAH CONST. Art. I, § 4.
77. ILL. CONST. Art. II, § 3.
78. E.g., CALIF. CONST. Art. IV, § 30; MIss. CONST. Art. 4, § 66.
79. E.g., GA. CoxsT. Art. I, § 1, 1 XIV; WYo. CONST. Art. I, § 19.
80. Oa. CoNsx. Art. I, § 5.
81. MiCH. CONsT. Art. V, § 26.
82. E.g., IDAHO CoNsT. Art. IX, § 5.
83. E.g., Miss. CoNsT. Art. 8, § 208; FLA. CONST. Art. XII, § 13.
84. E.g., NEB. CoNsT. Art. VII, § 11; S.D. CoNST. Art. VIII, § 16.
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State courts have been virtually unanimous in declaring unconstitutional
any attempt to pay sums directly to schools organized by religious groups.8,5
Beyond this core of agreement the states have widely diverged in deciding
what is constitutionally permissible state aid to religion. The cost of caring
for students who are public charges in a religiously controlled institution may
be paid in some states but not in others."6 It is constitutional in at least two
states to furnish free textbooks to scholars in church schools.
8 7
The emergence of the consolidated school, made possible by school-bus
transportation throughout a large area, and the increased number of parochial
schools have combined to present the courts with a difficult question of
Church-State relationship: may publicly financed bus transportation be fur-
nished to parochial school students? An increasing minority of state courts
has permitted the school bus expenditure, principally on the ground that the
appropriation was not for the benefit of the sectarian schools, but rather for
the safety and welfare of the pupils who attend them.8 8 The appropriation
is usually characterized as a form of public welfare legislation. In New York
after the court of appeals bad declared free bus transportation to parochial
schools a violation of New York's constitution, an amendment was added
expressly permitting the expenditure of money for bus transportation.8 9
The majority position was reinforced in 1949 by a Washington opinion90
handed down after the United States Supreme Court case, EZ}erson v. Board
of Education,9' which removed any Fourteenth Amendment obstacles to
appropriations for free bus transportation to church schools. The Washing-
ton court refused to allow the expenditure because of state constitutional
provisions that common school funds should be applied exclusively to the
support of the common schools, and that all schools maintained by public
funds should be forever free from sectarian influence. The relative importance
of the Everson case in the state of Washington was sharply stated:
"Our own state constitution provides that no public money or property shall be
used in support of institutions wherein the tenets of a particular religion are taught.
85. E.g., Wright v. School Dist., 151 Kan. 485, 99 P.2d 737 (1940) ; State ex tel.
Public School District v. Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573 (1932). See also Williams
v. Board of Trustees, 173 Ky. 708, 191 S.W. 507 (1917).
86. Compare Sargent v. Board of Education, 177 N.Y. 317, 69 N.E. 722 (1904), with
State ex rel. Nevada Orphan Asylum v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373 (1882). See also New
Haven v. Town of Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 43 A.2d 455 (1945); Murrow Indian
Orphans Home v. Childers, 197 Okla. 249, 171 P.2d 600 (1946).
87. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1030, 123 So. 664
(1929) ; Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Board, 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941).
88. Bowker v. Baker, 73 Cal. App.2d 653, 167 P.2d 256 (1946) ; Nichols v. Henry,
301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d 930 (1945); Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199
Atl. 628 (1938) ; Everson v. Board of Education, 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (1945),
are cases upholding a school bus expenditure. Leading cases to the contrary are State
ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181, 172 Atl. 835 (1934) ; Judd v. Board of Education,
278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938) ; Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002
(1941) ; Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist., 17 Wash.2d 61, 135 P.2d 79 (1943).
89. N.Y. CoNsr. Art. XI, § 4.
90. Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash.2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949>.
91. 330 U.S. 1, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947).
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Although the decisions of the United States supreme court are entitled to the highest
consideration as they bear on related questions before this court, we must, in the light
of the clear provisions of our state constitution and our decisions thereunder, respect-
fully disagree with those portions of the Everson majority opinion which might be
construed, in the abstract, as stating that transportation, furnished at public expense,
to children attending religious schools, is not in support of such schools. While the
degree of support necessary to constitute an establishment of religion under the First
Amendment to the Federal constitution is foreclosed from consideration by reason
of the decision in the Everson case, supra, we are constrained to hold that the
Washington constitution although based upon the same precepts, is a clear denial
of the rights herein asserted by the appellant."'
The failure of the family and the Sunday school to provide what many
people regard as adequate religious instruction has resulted in widespread at-
tempts to incorporate some form of religious instruction into the public
school system. Religious instruction, even though offered on a tripartite basis
with separate instruction for Catholics, Protestants and Jews, cannot be
carried on as part of the compulsory school work without violating both the
state and federal constitutions. The state of Washington has even declared
it unconstitutional to give high school credit for religious study done out-
side the school.93 School boards in cooperation with religious groups have
sought to use the apparatus of the public school to aid religious education by
various "released time" plans. These schemes vary a great deal in detail but
characteristic of most are: (1) religious instruction by teachers provided by
religious groups; (2) a meeting time during the regular school hours; (3)
provisions that nonparticipating pupils be kept in school supposedly busy with
other work. In Illinois ex rel. IV1cCollunt v. Board of Education,"4 the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a "released time" system in which the reli-
gious instruction was given in the public school building itself. Religious
groups have attempted to satisfy the McCollim case by formulating methods
of religious study not within its ban. Two opinions in the lower courts have
upheld a New York arrangement by which religious instruction is given out-
side the school houses and by which no attempt is made to prevent the re-
leased pupils from "playing hookey."90
A great many schools which do not have formal religious instruction
begin each day with a recital of the Lord's Prayer and the reading of passages
from the Bible without comment by the teacher. The constitutionality of Bible
reading in school has been a very fruitful source of Church-State litigation.
92. 207 P.2d at 205 (italics are the court's).
93. State v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 Pac. 35 (1918).
94. 333 U.S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948).
95. Lewis v. Spaulding, 193 Misc. 66, 85 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Zorach v.
Clauson, 99 N.Y.S.2d 339 (Sup. Ct. 1950). The present New York scheme was approved
by the Illinois Supreme Court before the McCidlom case. People cx rel. Latimer v.
Board of Education, 394 Ill. 228, 68 N.E.2d 305 (1946). Gordon v. Board of Education,
78 Cal. App.2d. 464, 178 P.2d 488 (1947) is also a pre-McCUidlom case upholding an off-
campus released time system.
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Although there has been some dissent, particularly in older cases, 6 the great
majority of states permit the reading as well as the prayer.9 7 In 1950 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the constitutionality of a state statute
which required the reading of at least five verses of the Old Testament
each morning and the repeating of the Lord's Prayer. 8 To the Court the Old
Testament is not sectarian, being accepted by Jews, Catholics, Protestants and
other religions. Religious groups not looking for guidance from the Old
Testament are a small minority in this country and their impact on our na-
tional life negligible. A belief in God is the warp and woof of our social
and governmental fabric. It may be of the highest importance for the nation
to retain its belief in God. The daily reading of a few portions of the Old
Testament and the repeating of the Lord's Prayer, the Court said, may serve
the keep that belief alive. Implanting a belief in God may be the nation's
last defense against Communism.
There have been instances in which a parochial school has, in effect,
been taken over by the public school system. A case from Indiana will serve
as an example.99 The city of Vincennes incorporated three Catholic schools
into its public school system. The church contributed the buildings, heat,
utilities and janitor service. The city hired as teachers the sisters and brothers
who had formerly taught in the parochial school. The tea6hers remained in
religious garb and the school buildings retained all the religious devices and-
pictures. The Catholic children of Vincennes were permitted to attend these
schools irrespective of the school district in which they lived.- The schools
conformed to the public school curriculum. Supposedly voluntary religious
instruction was given the pupils in a nearby Roman Catholic Church for
thirty minutes each morning, immediately before the hours of school. The
Indiana Supreme Court refused to hold the arrangements unconstitutionaL
This decision goes very far indeed toward upholding state advancement of
religious ends. Not only does the result approve direct governmental pro-
96. People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910);.
Herold v. Parish Board, 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915) ; State ex rel. Weiss v. District
Board, 76 Wis. 177, 44 NWY. 967 (1890); cf. Board of Education v. Mifior, 23 Ohio
St. 211 (1872) ; Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 226 N.W. 348 (1929).
97. E.g., People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927);
Wilkerson v. Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895 (1922); Kaplan v. Independent School
Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927); Lewis v. Board of Education, 157 Misc.
520, 285 N.Y.S. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1930), 247 App. Div. 106, 286 N.Y.S. 174 (lst Dep't 1936),
appeal dismissed, 276 N.Y. 490, 12 N.E.2d 172 (1937). Art. 3, § 18 of the Mississippi
Constitution expressly permits Bible reading in the public schools.
98. Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950).
99. State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256 (1940). School boards
have been permitted to employ teachers who were members of religious orders although
the teachers continued to wear religious garb in the classroom. Gerhardt v. Heid, 66
N.D. 444, 267 N.W. 127 (1936); Hysong v. Galitzin School Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 30
Atl. 482 (1894). There are state cases contra to the Indiana case, supra. See, e.g.,
Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202 (1918); Harfst v. Hoegen, 349
Mo. 808, 163 S;W.2d 609 (1941).
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motion of religion but it also permits instruction in the tenets of a particular
church.
Not every Church-State question revolves around the school room.
Litigants have sometimes unsuccessfully attacked the tax exemption of
religious institutions. 100 The argument that a particular appropriation is a
public welfare expenditure and not an aid to religion becomes especially acute
when payments are made directly to sectarian charitable institutions who,
though controlled by some religious group, nevertheless operate as hospitals,
orphanages and old peoples' homes. One recent case raising this issue upheld
the constitutionality of a Mississippi appropriation for the erection of cer-
tain hospital buildings which were to be added to church hospitals.10 1 The
expenditure did not violate a section of the Mississippi State Constitution
which provides: "No law granting a donation or gratuity . ..shall be en-
acted . . . for a sectarian purpose or use."'01 2 The appropriation was not con-
sidered a donation or gratuity, but rather an expenditure for which the state
would receive a quid pro quo. The constitution did not forbid appropriations to
sectarian institutions but merely for a sectarian purpose. Thus the Mississippi
Supreme Court was able to distinguish cases from other jurisdictions which
had held similar appropriations violations of their state constitutions because
in those states appropriations to sectarian institutions, as such, were flatly
prohibited 103
In 1948, the Supreme Court of Utah in two cases sustained public ex-
penditures allegedly made for a religious purpose. In one case a statute was
upheld which permitted former Mormon parochial school teachers to re-
ceive credit, when computing retirement benefits in the public schools, for
services rendered during their period as instructors in the Mormon school
system.104 In sustaining the enactment the Utah Court pointed out that
Mormon parochial schools no longer exist. No Mormon school teachers were
presently building up state retirement benefits by service in the parochial
schools. The court thought the statute accomplished an important public pur-
pose by attracting teachers into the public school system after the church
schools were closed in 1937. In the second case the plaintiff sought to enjoin
the Daughters of the Utah Pioneers from carrying out legislatively authorized
construction of a Pioneer Memorial building in which the D.U.P. would
100. E.g., Trustees of First Methodist Church v. Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181 (1886);
Garrett Biblical Inst. v. Elmhurst State Bank, 331 Ill. 308, 163 N.E. 1 (1928). See
Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Lcgislation, 14 LAw &
CONTEAMP. PROB. 144, 145-48 (1950).
101. Craig v. Mercy Hospital, 45 So.2d 809 (Miss. 1950). The result has also
been reached recently in Kentucky. Kentucky Building Comm'n v. Effron, 310 Ky. 355,
220 S.W.2d 836 (1949).
102. Miss. CONST. Art. IV, § 66.
103. E.g., Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 Atl. 440 (1921) ; Synod of Dakota v.
State, 2 S.D. 366, 50 N.W. 632 (1891).104. Gubler v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board, 192 P.2d 580 (Utah 1948).
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display historical relics.10 5 In order to understand this controversy, it is
necessary to know something of the Daughters of the Utah Pioneers. They
are a group of women, over the age of eighteen, who are lineal descendents
of settlers -who came to Utah prior to the advent of the railroad on May 10,
1869. The group is devoted to the study of state history, religious history
and geneology. The overwhelming majority of the members are Mormons or
of Mormon ancestory. One of the announced objects of the organization is
to seek and promote the purposes that the pioneers had in view when they
came to Utah and to teach their descendents and the citizens of the country
those lessons of faith, courage and patriotism. At the local level the associa-
tion is set up along the geographical lines of the Latter Day Saints Church.
According to the plaintiffs the organization would use the building and the
exhibits as an opportunity for aggressive proselytizing. However, the Utah
court upheld the validity of the expenditure. The majority opinion took
cognizance of the membership of non-Mormons in the organization; and
failed to see any present evidence of the plaintiffs fears. The plaintiff's entire
case rested on the character of the D.U.P. and its intentions in connection with
the use of the building. In Utah to commemorate early state history is neces-
sarily to emphasize objects and documents which have a distinctive religious
significance.
Sometimes complaint is made if public officials and legislatures lend their
aid to the enforcement of religious holidays. Sunday legislation has been
frequently attacked with conspicuous lack of success as an unconstitutional
violation of Church-State separation.106
Two recent cases limit the use of the facilities of religious organizations
as part of a state court's remedial system. An Illinois statute, attempting
to minimize some of the social problems of divorce, set up a divorce division
in some courts. The division could attempt to reconcile the estranged parties
and could make independent investigations regarding alimony, child custody
and support. In the reconciliation process, the division. was empowered to
invite the assistance of representatives of the religious denominations to which
the parties belonged. The Supreme Court of Illinois could see no difference
between this situation and that in the McCollum case.' 0 7 In the eyes of the
Illinois Court the statute used a tax-established and tax-supported instru-
mentality of justice to aid religious groups in spreading their faith. In
Virginia the Supreme Court reversed a lower court judge who had placed
delinquent children on probation upon the condition, among others, that each
child would attend Sunday school and church .for a year. 08
105. Thomas v. Daughters of the Utah Pioneers, 197 P.2d 477 (Utah 1948).
106. Paramount-Richards Theaters v. Hattiesburg, 49 So.2d 574 (Miss. 1950) ; Peo-
ple v. Friedman, 96 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 1950); State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash.2d 603, 206
P.2d 1022 (1949) are recent examples.
107. People ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek, 405 11. 510, 91 N.E.2d 588 (1950).




Although state constitutions contain full statements of our civil liberties,
on the whole the record of state court guardianship of "First Amendment
Freedoms" is disappointing. Only occasionally do state cases concerned with
freedom of press, speech, assembly and worship take a position protecting the
freedoms beyond what has been required by the United States Supreme
Court. The actions of the Florida and Pennsylvania Courts upholding anti-
sound truck ordinances after the Kovacs case are far more typical. Time and
time again, the United States Supreme Court has found it necessary to reverse
many state courts which were oversolicitous of local attempts to silence un-
popular ideas on the ground of traffic control, the administration of public
parks or the possibility of violence.
Even more disheartening is the failure of state supreme courts to see a
threat to personal liberty in the many oath requirements imposed particularly
upon public employees. The opinions, too often, accept uncritically Mr.
Justice Holmes' dictum that a man "may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."' 01 With an ever
increasing number of persons working for the state such restrictions on free-
dom of expression can impose political sterility on a substantial segment of the
community. State court judges seem to have forgotten that the most im-
portant function of freedom is not to benefit the individual but to confer
upon the whole community the good which comes from the free interchange
of ideas.
Contemporary cases show an increasing reluctance to invalidate state
aids to religion. Instead of maintaining a "wall of separation" many state
courts have upheld enactments benefiting religion by narrow technical read-
ing of their state constitutions."10 Typically, assistance is not forbidden to reli-
gion but merely to the various sects as such. The historic principle of complete
state neutrality in religious affairs is ofttimes forgotten.
Thus the role of the United States Supreme Court in protecting our
freddom becomes crucial. Unlike economic arrangements civil liberties can
not become matters for state experimentation. In this light the refusal of the
present Supreme Court to take many important civil liberties cases from
to the state courts is unsound indeed. If our liberties are not protected in
Des Moines the only hope is in Washington.
109. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
110. Legislation providing for bus transportation to church schools was first in-
validated in Kentucky on the ground that the Kentucky Constitution expressly forbade
the diversion of school funds for sectarian purposes. Sherrard v. Board of Education
294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963 (1942). In Nichols v. Henry, 301 Ky. 434, 191 S.W.2d
930 (1945), the use of state funds other than school funds was approved for buses to
parochial schools.
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